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Abstract
In this article, we first test theories on immigrant rights across 29 countries from 
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, using our 
Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) data set. We focus on 
trajectories of nationhood and current institutional features to explain cross-
national difference. We find that former colonial powers, former colonies that 
developed as settler countries, as well as democracies have been more likely 
to extend rights to immigrants. Strikingly, once we account for involvement in 
colonialism, we find no difference between supposedly “civic-nationalist” early 
nation-states and supposedly “ethnic-nationalist” latecomer nations, refuting a 
widely held belief in the literature on citizenship. We find no effect of a country’s 
degree of political globalization. We replicate these findings on a sample of 35 
mainly European countries, using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).
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Introduction
Theorizing and empirical research on citizenship rights for immigrants have 
been mainly based on examples taken from Western Europe and the Anglo-
Saxon settler countries (e.g., Banting & Kymlicka, 2012; Brubaker, 1992; 
Howard, 2009; Janoski, 2010; Joppke, 1999, 2004; Koopmans, Michalowski, 
& Waibel, 2012; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Migration Policy 
Group, 2010; Soysal, 1994; Wallace Goodman, 2010). The present study aims 
to bring new countries outside the Western and Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) worlds into focus and to test hypoth-
eses on cross-national differences in immigrant rights against a larger variety of 
cases than have thus far been considered. Adopting an institutional framework, 
we build on theories that link immigrant rights to historical trajectories of 
nationhood, settlement, and colonialism. Regarding current institutional fea-
tures, we investigate whether liberal democracy affects immigrant rights and 
whether it matters to what extent countries are integrated in, and committed to, 
supranational institutions and conventions.
We use our Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI) data set 
that has recently been extended from originally 10 West European countries 
(see Koopmans et al., 2012) to 29 countries worldwide, including important 
immigration countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, North and South 
America, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and Oceania. We use these pol-
icy indicators to measure how nations define the boundaries of, and rules of, 
access to the polity, and the rights, obligations, and identities that tie states 
and citizens (Koopmans et al., 2005). Citizenship rights for immigrants 
define in what way immigrants are included into the nation and also help to 
understand how a nation defines itself.
To clarify what we mean by immigrant citizenship rights, we make two 
important conceptual distinctions. First, immigrant citizenship rights are dif-
ferent from immigration rights or policies. Whereas the latter refer to the 
rules that regulate legal access to a state’s territory, the former refer to the 
rights that immigrants can acquire once they have been granted legal entry.1 
Second, unlike studies on immigrant rights that focus on naturalization and 
other forms of access to nationality (e.g., Howard, 2009; Janoski, 2010; Vink 
& Bauböck, 2013), our conceptualization of immigrant citizenship rights is a 
broader one. It takes into account that access to the nationality of a country is 
not always a necessary condition for access to rights (see, for example, 
Hammar, 1990; Soysal, 1994) and is certainly not a sufficient guarantee for 
fully equal rights; for instance, when the state provides no protection against 
discrimination or does not provide equal cultural and religious rights.
In our earlier work on immigrant rights (Koopmans et al., 2012), we 
focused on variables that explained changes in immigrant rights over the 
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period 1980-2008 in 10 West European countries. The findings pointed 
toward the importance of electoral factors. Countries where a significant 
share of the electorate had immigrant roots were more likely to see subse-
quent liberalizations of immigrant rights, which, if they led to easier natural-
ization and more immigration, in turn expanded the immigrant electorate. By 
contrast, countries with strong right-wing populist, anti-immigrant parties 
saw less strong subsequent expansion or even contractions of immigrant 
rights. This study, however, also revealed a strong degree of historical conti-
nuity across the three decades, with countries’ relative positions on immi-
grant rights in 1980 being the best predictor of their positions in 2008. Across 
15 countries for which we have data for both 1980 and 2008 (the 10 countries 
from the 2012 study plus the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Portugal), the correlation between immigrant rights across the two time 
points is as high as .78 (p < .001). Because of its focus on changes over time, 
our earlier study left these strong historical continuities and relatively stable 
cross-national rank orderings unexplained. It is these continuities and cross-
national differences that are at the center of attention of the current study.
Theory and Hypotheses
The literature on citizenship rights for immigrants has been strongly influ-
enced by Kohn’s (1944) classic distinction between “civic” and “ethnic” 
nationalism, the former according to Kohn characteristic of early European 
nation-states West of the Rhine, such as France, the United Kingdom, and 
Switzerland, and the latter typifying the latecomer nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe, such as Germany, Poland, and Hungary. In a similar vein, 
Tilly (1994) distinguished between state-led and state-seeking nationalism. 
In the former case, a pre-existing territorial state, such as France or the United 
Kingdom, aimed to galvanize an overarching national identity for an often 
linguistically, culturally, and religiously heterogeneous population. In state-
seeking nationalism, by contrast, ethno-cultural groups that as yet had no 
unified, sovereign territory sought to establish a state for themselves, either 
by unifying several smaller polities (as in the cases of Italy and Germany), or 
by seceding from larger, multinational polities (e.g., Poland or Norway). The 
state-led nationalism of early nation-states is supposed to go along with civic 
models of nationhood, in which the key membership criteria of citizenship 
are birth and residence on the state territory, regardless of ethnicity. The state-
seeking nationalism of latecomer nations, by contrast, is supposed to define 
citizenship in terms of ethnic belonging and includes co-ethnic diasporas 
abroad within the nation, while denying ethnic minorities living on the state 
territory full equality (Hobsbawm, 1990; Kohn, 1944).
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In his widely influential comparison of France and Germany, Brubaker 
(1992) claimed that these different historical trajectories of nationhood still 
shape how nation-states deal with immigrant rights. He argued that the civic-
political understanding of the nation that prevails in France gave rise to a ter-
ritorial notion of citizenship that allowed for easier naturalization of immigrants 
and automatic access for their French-born children through the jus soli prin-
ciple. The ethno-cultural idiom of nationhood in Germany, by contrast, made 
access to German citizenship very difficult for immigrants and even for their 
German-born children, while ethnic Germans outside the territorial boundar-
ies of the state were granted privileged access to citizenship rights.
Although it has been extremely influential as a heuristic descriptive tool, 
the ethnic–civic distinction is of little use as an explanatory theory for immi-
grant rights because the “ethnicness” or “civicness” of a nation-state is inex-
tricably tied to the degree to which it extends citizenship rights to immigrants. 
We can, however, test the underlying idea that these ethnic and civic notions 
of nationhood have their origins in different historical trajectories related to 
the type and timing of nation-state formation. If Brubaker’s argument about 
the reasons for the different ways in which France and Germany treat their 
immigrants is generalizable, other European latecomer nation-states that 
resulted from state-seeking nationalist mobilization (such as Italy, Poland, or 
Norway) should, like Germany, be restrictive regarding the rights of non–co-
ethnic immigrants. By contrast, countries with long-standing territorial sov-
ereignty (such as Spain, the Netherlands, or Sweden) should, like France, be 
characterized by a civic, inclusive approach to immigrant rights.
A problem with these theories of nationalism and immigrant rights is that 
they are overwhelmingly based on European examples. Only a handful of 
non-European states—for example, Japan, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Thailand—
are comparable with France in having long-standing independent territorial 
sovereignty. There are also hardly any non-European nations that resulted 
from wars of national unification comparable with those that led to the for-
mation of modern Germany and Italy, with perhaps Vietnam as an exception. 
Likewise, territorial secessions comparable with those that led to the forma-
tion of many European states (such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or the 
states that split off Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union) have been very rare 
among postcolonial states (the break-up of British India is an early exception, 
South Sudan is a more recent one). Virtually all non-European countries 
resulted from independence movements that did not challenge the haphaz-
ardly drawn territorial boundaries that resulted from the vagaries of competi-
tion among the colonial powers (Austen, 2004). The overwhelming majority 
of postcolonial states still exist within these colonial boundaries. It is unclear 
whether the nationalisms of these states should be expected to be more like 
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the state-seeking nationalisms in Europe (because they gained independent 
sovereignty through nationalist mobilization) or more like European state-led 
nationalisms (because their territorial boundaries preceded the formation of 
the nation and mostly do not even remotely coincide with ethnic boundaries). 
We will therefore treat postcolonial countries as a separate category in our 
analyses and will not formulate a directional hypothesis about whether immi-
grant rights should be more or less inclusive in them. For the other countries, 
however, theories of nationalism lead us to expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: Nation-states that have emerged from state-seeking seces-
sionist or national unification movements will be more restrictive regard-
ing immigrant rights than nation-states with long-standing territorial 
sovereignty.
Empirical studies of Western European immigration countries and Anglo-
Saxon settler states have pointed toward colonialism as another aspect of nation-
state formation that has shaped the extension of rights to immigrants. Both 
Janoski (2010) and Howard (2009) find that former colonial powers tend to be 
more inclusive regarding immigrant rights. Janoski (2010) argues that to dura-
bly and efficiently control their colonial territories, colonial powers had to 
include elite members of the colonized populations in the colonial administra-
tion, and many of these native elites spent time in the colonial metropolises for 
study and training purposes. Moreover, indigenous soldiers and officers were 
needed to fight colonial wars or even to defend the home country, as in the First 
and Second World Wars. Such dedication of colonial subjects to the colonial 
regime, argues Janoski, could not be obtained without the granting of some 
rights—even if they fell short of full citizenship—to them. Before, during, and 
after the decolonization wave between 1945 and 1975, many immigrants from 
former or remaining colonies used these citizenship or subject rights to migrate 
to the colonial centers. According to Janoski and Howard, the pre-existing rights 
of colonial subjects, as well as the mutual cultural familiarity and at least to 
some extent shared identity between subjects and rulers led to more inclusive 
rights regimes for immigrants, from which subsequently also non-colonial 
immigrants profited. This results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Former colonial powers will have extended more rights to 
immigrants compared with countries that have no pre-existing ties to their 
immigrant populations.
Janoski (2010) further argues that former colonies that became settler 
countries—in his study represented by the United States, Canada, Australia, 
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and New Zealand—are likely to grant more rights to immigrants. These colo-
nies were established in parts of the world where the population density of the 
aboriginal population was low and where natives were often further deci-
mated by wars and diseases that followed the arrival of Western colonizers. 
As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have argued, this made it impossible to 
base an extractive colonial regime on the exploitation of native labor, as for 
instance the Spaniards had done in Mexico and Peru, where the aboriginal 
population density was much higher. Instead, the colonies of North America 
and Oceania depended on settler immigrants from Europe, who were obvi-
ously not willing to come if they were not granted a fair amount of rights and 
freedom in their new homelands. In the United States, to be sure, the need for 
labor was initially partly met by imported slaves, but after the abolition of 
slavery, the only way to continue the settlement and development of its vast 
territory was to be open to immigration, even though not necessarily to immi-
grants of all races (see FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014). This may result in 
a self-perpetuating dynamic, driven by the fact that a large part of the popula-
tions of these countries consists of immigrants and their descendants, which 
creates a more favorable opinion climate for further immigration and expan-
sions of immigrant rights (see Koopmans et al., 2012, for evidence of a simi-
lar dynamic in Europe since 1980). Janoski (2010) found that the settler 
countries indeed have systematically higher naturalization rates—his output 
indicator for immigrant rights. However, it remains to be seen whether this 
finding stands the test in a larger sample and for immigrant rights in a broader 
sense. The settler countries included by Janoski were all Anglo-Saxon democ-
racies, but our sample includes three additional settler countries: Argentina, 
Venezuela, and Singapore. We hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Long-standing settler countries will have granted more 
rights to immigrants, compared with countries that have only recently 
begun to be confronted with mass immigration.
Moving now from historical legacies to current institutional structures, we 
highlight two factors: domestic democracy and countries’ commitment to, 
and involvement in, supranational political institutions and norms. Joppke 
(2001) has argued that the egalitarian norms to which liberal democracies are 
committed are behind the expansion of immigrant rights in Western countries 
in the postwar decades. Commitment to these norms, he argues, makes it dif-
ficult to exclude immigrants from the full rights that citizens enjoy and to 
treat different ethnic and religious groups unequally. Because democracy was 
a virtual constant in most previous studies, there is thus far little empirical 
evidence for the claim that democracy leads to more inclusive immigrant 
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rights. Koopmans et al. (2012) looked at a key mechanism that Joppke (2001) 
proposes for the enforcement of immigrant rights in liberal democracies, 
namely, independent courts. They found no relationship between the institu-
tional strength of the judiciary and the expansion of immigrant rights in 
Europe since the 1980s. The same study, however, also provides evidence of 
a self-reinforcing feedback dynamic in democracies: to the extent that at least 
some immigrants or their children become citizens, they become part of the 
electorate and thereby of the calculus of political parties. The larger the 
immigrant electorate, the greater the pressure to make immigrant rights more 
inclusive, which in turn expands the immigrant electorate, and so forth.
By contrast, FitzGerald’s and Cook-Martín’s (2014) study of the link between 
democracy and racially selective immigration policies across the Americas in the 
19th and 20th centuries points in the reverse direction: The most democratic 
country in the region, the United States, was one of the latest countries in the 
Hemisphere to remove racially selective immigration barriers. The authors argue 
that elites in non-democratic states, who have an interest in cheap and abundant 
labor for their businesses and are not constrained by electoral considerations, 
may be more open toward immigration than mass electorates, who may be 
unwilling to allow certain groups of immigrants into the country, both for racist-
ideological reasons, and to avoid downward pressures on wages. FitzGerald’s 
and Cook-Martín’s evidence is strong, but it pertains mostly to immigration 
rights. Their analyses show that discriminatory patterns are less clear-cut for 
naturalization policies: although the United States and Canada were the last 
countries to abolish restrictions for certain ethnic groups in their naturalization 
laws (in 1952 and 1947, respectively; FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014, see 
Table A1 in the appendix by Angela S. García), many Latin American countries 
have retained preferential access to naturalization for culturally proximate—
Spanish or Portuguese-speaking—groups until the present (FitzGerald & Cook-
Martín, 2014, also see Figure 3). Whether FitzGerald’s and Cook-Martín’s 
conclusions on the negative effects of democracy can be extrapolated from immi-
gration policies to immigrant rights is therefore not immediately apparent: 
although the interest of elites in non-democracies in cheap laborers is clear, it is 
less clear why they should be willing to extend rights to these workers.
The wide sample of countries in the current study allows for a more wide-
ranging test of the liberal democracy argument than has been possible in pre-
vious studies of immigrant rights because it includes countries that are, to 
varying degrees, non-democratic (Kuwait, Singapore, Russia, and Venezuela), 
as well as Turkey as a borderline case (see below, for the operationalization 
of democracy). In addition, it includes democracies from geographical and 
cultural regions that have not been considered in previous studies (e.g., sub-
Saharan Africa). Our hypothesis follows Joppke’s (2001) and Koopmans 
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et al.’s (2012) arguments about normative spillover and positive electoral 
feedback effects:
Hypothesis 4: Democratic countries will have extended more rights to 
immigrants than countries that are less or not democratic.
Against theories that argue that domestic democracy is decisive in shaping 
immigrant rights, several scholars have argued that the expansion of immigrant 
rights in the postwar period is mainly driven by the spread of a “postnational 
citizenship” based in universal notions of individual and group rights laid down 
in supranational treaties and conventions (Jacobson, 1997; Sassen, 1998; 
Soysal, 1994). These, so the argument goes, guarantee immigrants’ claims to a 
wide range of rights that are largely decoupled from national legacies and insti-
tutions. Thus far, cross-national studies of immigrant rights have provided little 
support for this view, but this may be due to the limited range of variation 
included in these studies. In our own earlier study of 10 West European coun-
tries, we found no relationship between immigrant rights and EU membership, 
but this may have been due to the fact that even the non-EU members in that 
sample (Norway and Switzerland) are strongly linked to the EU by way of 
bilateral treaties as well as non-EU forms of European integration, such as the 
Schengen regime of open borders and common visa regulations. Our current 
sample allows a much better test of the impact of supranational norms and 
institutions. It not only includes highly supranationally integrated European 
Union member states and countries associated to the EU by various treaties 
(Switzerland, Norway, and Turkey) but also a range of non-European countries 
with varying levels of integration into supranational institutions and treaties. 
Based on the postnational perspective, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Countries that are strongly embedded in international orga-
nizations and committed to international treaties and the human rights 
norms that these embody will have extended more rights to immigrants 
compared with countries that are weakly integrated into international 
organizations and committed to fewer international treaty obligations.
Data and Operationalization
Case Selection
The 29 countries included in our study harbor 60% of the world’s immigrant 
population.2 We started out (see Koopmans et al., 2012) with the 10 most 
important North and West European immigration countries (Germany, 
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France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Austria) and subsequently extended the data 
set with the four classical Anglo-Saxon immigration countries (the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), three South European (Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy), three East European (Russia, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic), and three Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Israel, and Kuwait), 
as well as two countries each from South America (Argentina and Venezuela), 
Africa (South Africa and Ghana), and East Asia (Japan and Singapore). We 
arrived at these choices by first narrowing down the available options to 
countries where immigration has at least some minimal relevance, both in 
absolute numbers, and in terms of immigrants’ share of the population. As 
cutoff points, we chose an absolute number of immigrants of at least 250,000 
and a population share of at least 0.5% (higher cutoff points would have left 
us with little to choose in some world regions). This led us to exclude not 
only many mini-states but also large countries such as India and China, where 
immigration is marginal relative to the total population. Within each geo-
graphical region, we strove to choose the countries with the highest popula-
tion shares and absolute numbers of immigrants, but we also had to deal with 
the pragmatic restriction that we were not always able to find suitable local 
experts to help us gather the information we needed for our coding. This, for 
instance, prevented us from choosing Saudi Arabia or the United Arab 
Emirates, but we were able to include Kuwait, the third most important immi-
gration country in the Middle Eastern region in terms of the absolute number 
of immigrants and the second highest in terms of the immigrant population 
share. The countries chosen not only cover a wide geographical area, but also 
vary strongly in terms of the share of immigrants among the total population, 
from 1% in Poland to 70% in Kuwait; their GDP, from Singapore, the third 
richest country in the world (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2015) to 
Ghana, 139 on the list with a per capita GDP at purchasing power parity that 
is 20 times lower than Singapore’s; as well as our dependent and independent 
variables of theoretical interest.
Dependent Variables
When comparing immigrant rights, it is important to acknowledge that these 
may vary strongly across types of immigrants. For instance, undocumented 
immigrants have very few rights at all, asylum seekers fall under a specific 
set of regulations, and some countries (e.g., Israel) offer privileged rights to 
diaspora immigrants that belong to the dominant ethnic group (so-called “co-
ethnic” migrants). Regional integration entities such as the EU often confer 
privileged rights on citizens of member states. We will not focus on such 
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immigrant groups with special rights, but on mainstream legal immigrants 
that do not belong to a special preference category.
Building on our previous work (Koopmans et al., 2012; Koopmans et al., 
2005), we use a two-dimensional conceptual framework of immigrant rights. 
The first “individual equality” dimension relates to the question whether 
immigrants have the same individual rights and duties as non-immigrants. 
The second, “cultural difference” dimension relates to the discussion on mul-
ticultural rights and to whether immigrants can claim rights, exemptions from 
existing rules, and state support as members of cultural or religious minority 
groups. Countries that score high on the dimension of individual rights pro-
vide easy access to the nationality, encompassing protection against discrimi-
nation, and offer similar rights to citizens and aliens. Countries that score 
high on the cultural and religious difference dimension make few cultural 
assimilation demands, allow expressions of cultural and religious difference 
in public institutions, incorporate ethnic and religious organizations in politi-
cal decision making, and facilitate separate institutional arrangements for 
minorities in institutions such as schools and public media.
To empirically measure immigrant citizenship rights, we draw on the 
Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants Index (ICRI).3 It is based on 
44 policy indicators, 21 pertaining to the individual equality dimension and 23 
to the cultural difference dimension.4 These indicators are identical to those 
used in our earlier West European study (Table 1 in Koopmans et al., 2012), 
except for three new indicators that had thus far not been included in the index 
because they were constant across the original set of countries, but became 
variables in the wider set. The first of these captures the fact that whereas other 
countries vary in the criteria they set for naturalization, Kuwait, Singapore, 
and Israel make it practically impossible for immigrants who do not belong to 
the dominant ethnic group (Israel) to special categories of high-skilled visa 
holders (Singapore) or for immigrants generally (Kuwait) to naturalize. 
Second, several of the newly added countries do not provide for any possibil-
ity of family reunification for non–co-ethnic immigrants (Israel) or limit it to 
select groups of high-skilled workers (Singapore, Russia) or to male immi-
grants (Kuwait). Third, although other countries vary in the extent to which 
they grant voting rights to resident non-citizens, Kuwait strongly restricts the 
voting rights even of those few immigrants who are allowed to naturalize: 
Thirty years of residence after naturalization are required for the right to vote.
A second adaptation that we needed to make pertained to the religious 
rights that are part of the cultural difference dimension. Originally, these indi-
cators always referred to Islam, because this is the most important immigrant 
religion in Western Europe. However, in some of our new countries, Muslims 
are the majority of the population or another religion than Islam is the most 
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important immigrant religion. In such cases, we chose the rights of Christians 
(Turkey, Kuwait, Israel, and Japan), Hindus (Singapore), or Buddhists (Czech 
Republic) as the basis for coding these indicators.
For the West European countries and the four Anglo-Saxon immigration 
countries, we have longitudinal data for the period 1980-2008, but for the 
other countries, our data are limited to the year 2008 because of the limited 
availability and accessibility of historical data. Our analysis is therefore 
cross-sectional across the 29 countries for the year 2008. Information was 
collected and coded with the help of research assistants or, in those cases 
where we could not ourselves check the primary data because of language 
limitations, with the help of local experts on immigrant rights. The data set 
with information on the coding rules and a list of the experts consulted can be 
found on the project website.5 In our earlier publication based on 10 West 
European countries, we compared our data with several other data sets that 
have quantified aspects of immigrant rights, such as naturalization policies. 
We found that our coding correlates very strongly with other projects, giving 
us confidence in the reliability of our country scores.6 Because few projects 
have ventured outside of the set of Western countries, we cannot compare our 
data here for the full set of countries with other available data. The most 
extensive comparison is possible with the Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX) of the Migration Policy Group, which includes, with the exception 
of Russia, all the European countries in our sample, as well as Turkey, the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan. MIPEX virtually only includes 
indicators that are situated on our individual equality dimension. For the 20 
countries that are represented in both data sets, the Pearson correlation 
between the individual inequality dimension of our data and the MIPEX data 
for 2010 is as high as .82, p < .001. MIPEX also correlates strongly with our 
score across all rights (.81, p < .001), but as expected, less strongly with the 
cultural difference dimension (.67, p < .01).7
We summarize these indicator data in three dependent variables that aver-
age respectively across all 44 indicators and across the individual equality 
and cultural difference dimensions separately. All indicators are coded on a 
scale running from −1 (most restrictive) to +1 (most inclusive), and the same, 
therefore, also holds for the averaged scores.
Explanatory Variables
Based on the theories behind Hypotheses 1 to 3, we create a typology of five 
types of countries, which we use as dummy variables in the analysis: former 
colonial powers, other early nation-states, latecomer nations, settler coun-
tries, and other former colonies.
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Colonial powers. Those countries that by the end of World War II still ruled 
significant overseas possessions: Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. If countries had lost their colonial possessions 
by 1945, we consider this experience not relevant for how these countries 
dealt with postwar immigrants. We thus exclude Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Sweden, as well as Denmark, which by the end of World War II only retained 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which even currently have together less 
than 100,000 inhabitants.
Other early nation-states. According to theorists such as Hobsbawm (1992), 
Kohn (1944), and Tilly (1994), the shift from civic, state-led to ethnic, 
state-seeking nationalism occurred over the course of the 19th century. We 
therefore define those countries that already had independent sovereignty 
by 1850 as early nations, and those that became independent or unified 
after 1850 as latecomers. Excluding those countries that we classify among 
the colonial powers (see above) or among the settler states (see below), the 
following countries make up the category of other early nation-states: 
Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Japan, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. Tur-
key and Austria did not exist as such in 1850, but formed the core of mul-
tinational continental empires. The countries that we know as Turkey and 
Austria today are the rump states that remained from these empires after 
World War I. One could therefore alternatively classify them as latecomer 
nations. In the “Robustness Checks” section after the main analyses, we 
will consider whether this affects our results. There, we will also examine 
whether an alternative specification, which uses the number of years a 
country has been independent instead of the dichotomous distinction 
between early and latecomer states, and which also captures variation in 
the timing of nation-state formation among colonial and postcolonial 
countries, leads to different results.
Latecomer nations. These we define as those countries that were not former 
colonies and that gained independence through ethnic secession or unifica-
tion after 1850. Thus, the category includes Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic.
Settler countries. Following Janoski (2010), settler countries are former colo-
nies established in areas of low pre-colonial population density that were 
subsequently populated by settler immigrants. In addition to the classical 
Anglo-Saxon immigration countries—the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand—this definition includes Argentina, Venezuela, and 
Singapore.8
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Other former colonies. This category includes those former colonies that were 
not settler countries. Among our sample of countries, this applies to Kuwait, 
Ghana, and South Africa. We do not consider South Africa as a settler state 
because it had a large pre-colonial population and even today descendants of 
settlers make up less than 20% of the population.
The case of Israel. Israel is difficult to classify because it resulted from a his-
torical trajectory that is quite unique. From the point of view of its current 
population, one might see Israel as a settler state (Markus & Semyonov, 2010): 
About 70% of the population within the 1967 borders is of (Jewish) immigrant 
descent. However, unlike the settler states that we discussed above, the British 
mandate territory of Palestine was not sparsely populated. Even today, after 
several massive waves of post-independence Jewish immigration, Jews make 
up only roughly half of the population within the former boundaries of Man-
datory Palestine. Another reason not to see Israel as a settler country compa-
rable with, for example, Canada or Argentina, is that Jews are one of the native 
ethnic groups of Palestine, even if prior to the First World War they were a 
small minority. Israel also differs from non-settler former colonies in that it 
was not established within the boundaries of a former colonial territory, but 
instead within a part of this territory designated—first by the United Nations 
partition plan and then by the Jewish state of Israel that emerged from the 
1948 war—as the sovereign home of the Jewish nation. Along the lines of 
authors such as Samuel Smooha (2002), who labels Israel as an “ethnic 
democracy,” we believe that Israel is better seen as a latecomer nation, which 
has more in common with European countries such as Germany or Poland 
than with former colonies such as Canada or Ghana. Like these European 
latecomer nations, Israel resulted from an ethno-nationalist movement, Zion-
ism, which aimed at ethnic secession (from Arab Palestine) and national uni-
fication (with the Jewish diaspora). The unique feature of Israel is that, unlike 
Italy and Germany, national unification occurred almost exclusively by way of 
co-ethnic immigration (Alijah) rather than through territorial unification. In 
Italy, diaspora immigration played no role in the national unification project, 
and in Germany, it became a significant factor only after the territorial losses 
of World War II. We admit, however, that this classification of Israel is debat-
able and will investigate in the section on “Robustness Checks” whether our 
results hold if we exclude Israel from the analysis.
Next to the five country types, we include two covariates in our analyses 
to test Hypotheses 4 and 5:
Democracy. We rely on the 2008 measures provided by the Polity IV Project. 
Polity IV indexes countries’ political systems on a scale from −10 (fully 
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autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). Polity classifies countries with a score 
of 6 or higher as democracies, those with a score of −6 or lower as autocra-
cies, and those in between as anocracies. According to this classification, 25 
of the 29 countries in our sample are democracies, three (Venezuela, Russia, 
and Singapore) are anocracies, and one is an autocracy (Kuwait; see Table A2 
for the Polity index scores for each country).
Political globalization. We use the 2008 value of the KOF political globaliza-
tion index developed by the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) at the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ).9 The measure combines 
four indicators: the number of foreign embassies and high commissions in a 
country, the number of international organizations of which it is a member, 
the number of times a country has participated in United Nations (UN) Secu-
rity Council missions, and the number of international treaties to which the 
country is a signatory. According to this index, France, the United States, and 
Russia are the most politically globalized countries. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Kuwait, Israel, and Singapore are the countries with the lowest 
levels of political globalization. We also consider two alternative measures of 
political globalization. The first is the number of human rights treaties (e.g., 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Their Families) that a country has signed and/or 
ratified as reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights.10 The second alternative measure is the International Non-
Governmental Organization Network Country Score (INCS) as developed by 
Paxton, Hughes, and Reith (2015). Both alternative measures correlate sig-
nificantly with the KOF measure, but they sometimes place individual coun-
tries quite differently. For instance, the United States score very highly on 
KOF and INCS, but low on the number of ratified human rights treaties.
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show the scores of all countries on the 
dependent and explanatory variables.
Descriptive Results: Global Variation in Immigrant 
Rights Regimes
Before moving to the explanatory analysis, our descriptive findings deserve 
attention. Beyond Europe, the classical Anglo-Saxon immigration, and Japan, 
little was known until now in a systematically comparative manner about how 
countries in other parts of the world deal with immigrant rights. Figure 1 visual-
izes the country scores in the two-dimensional policy space that we have elabo-
rated above. On the vertical axis, the individual rights dimension distinguishes 
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countries toward the top that have a “civic” approach to immigrant citizenship 
rights, with limited distinctions between the rights of immigrants and citizens, 
easy access to the nationality, and comparatively strong protection against dis-
crimination. Toward the bottom, we find countries with a more “ethnic” 
approach to immigrant rights, in which aliens have far fewer rights than citizens, 
obtaining the nationality is difficult or impossible, and discrimination is not only 
not combated, but in extreme cases, even legally enshrined. On the horizontal 
axis, the cultural difference dimension distinguishes countries toward the left 
that have a “monist” conception of cultural rights, which make access for immi-
grants to rights dependent on cultural assimilation and place restrictions on the 
expression of immigrant cultures and religions. Toward the right, we find 
Figure 1. Country positions in ICRI’s two-dimensional space of immigrant rights.
ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants.
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culturally and religiously “pluralist” countries that place few assimilation 
demands on immigrants, do not restrict immigrant religions, practice affirmative 
action for members of racial and cultural minority groups, and provide state 
recognition and support for ethnic organizations and representation of minori-
ties in institutions such as schools, the media, and the military.
As Figure 1 shows, the combination of a civic approach to individual 
equality and a pluralist approach to cultural difference, often labeled as “mul-
ticulturalism,” is essentially a Western phenomenon. It characterizes the 
countries in the top right of the figure, most clearly so the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands.
The top left quadrant of the figure delimits what Koopmans et al. (2005) 
labeled a “universalist” approach to immigrant citizenship rights, which 
grants a fair deal of equality to immigrants as individuals, but emphasizes 
assimilation to a shared public culture and grants few cultural and religious 
rights beyond the private sphere. Four countries come closest to this ideal 
type: France—the textbook case—but also Germany and the two South 
American countries, Argentina and Venezuela.
Moving downward in the left part of the figure, we encounter an approach 
to immigrant rights that Koopmans et al. label as “assimilationist,” which 
differentiates strongly between the rights of citizens and aliens, puts up high 
barriers for immigrants to obtain the nationality, requires assimilation to the 
dominant culture—defined in ethnic rather than civic terms—as a prerequi-
site for the acquisition of rights, and privileges the dominant religion over 
immigrant religions. Austria, Switzerland, Turkey, and Japan are most exem-
plary for this approach. As Koopmans et al. (2012) have shown, Germany 
also belonged in this camp until the end of the 20th century, when, in the 
wake of reunification, the country embarked on a liberalization of immigrant 
rights, particularly where access to the nationality is concerned. Three coun-
tries exemplify the combination of few individual and few cultural rights for 
immigrants to such an extent that they do not fit the label “assimilationist.” 
While in countries such as Switzerland immigrants can obtain equal citizen-
ship rights even though the requirements are strict, Singapore, Israel, and 
Kuwait do not even provide non–co-ethnic immigrants with a roadmap to full 
citizenship, or even to permanent residence, and they are not “assimilation-
ist” in any meaningful sense because they do not even strive to assimilate 
these immigrants into the dominant culture. The approach to immigrant rights 
in these three countries is therefore better characterized as “full exclusion.” 
Because they deviate so much from the other cases, it is worthwhile to give 
some examples of the degree of exclusion immigrants face in these countries, 
which we could only to some extent capture in our selected indicators. In all 
three countries, immigrants face immediate deportation if the labor contract 
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with their “sponsoring” employer ends. In Singapore and Kuwait, there is 
moreover little protection against employer arbitrariness, making immigrants 
extremely dependent on their employers with attendant risks of exploitation 
and abuse (for Singapore, see Bal, 2015; Yeoh & Chee, 2015; Yeoh & Lin, 
2012; for Kuwait, see the chapter on the discrimination of immigrants in 
El-Najjar, 2001; for Israel, see Raijman, Semyonov, & Schmidt, 2003; 
Rosenhek, 2000). Whereas all other countries delimit deportation after crimi-
nal conviction, based on some combination of the seriousness of the crime 
and the length of residence, Singapore and Kuwait allow the unconditional 
deportation of immigrants for any criminal conviction. In Israel and (except-
ing the highly skilled) Singapore, there is no right to family reunification for 
immigrants. In Singapore, most immigrants cannot even marry a Singaporean 
citizen, and female immigrant workers must undergo regular pregnancy tests 
and are deported when pregnant.
One country, Ghana, populates the lower right quadrant of the figure, 
which delimits what Koopmans et al. (2005) labeled as a “segregationist” 
approach, with relatively little individual equality, but relatively generous 
cultural group rights. To be sure, Ghana is not an extreme variant of such an 
approach, because it offers immigrants a degree of individual equality com-
parable with Turkey and Austria. The broad set of cultural rights available to 
immigrants in Ghana results primarily from the fact that although Ghana is a 
predominantly Christian country, Muslim immigrants profit from the reli-
gious rights that the autochthonous Muslim population (which forms about 
18% of Ghana’s population) enjoys. The same reason also applies to South 
Africa and Poland, the two countries situated most closely to Ghana. Both 
countries have small but long-standing Muslim minorities, respectively of 
Indian and Malay, and of Tatar origin, that date back several centuries. 
However, there is no necessary relationship between the presence of histori-
cal religious minorities and cultural rights for immigrants, because much 
depends on the rights status of these historical minorities. A case in point is 
Turkey, where historical as well as immigrant Christian minorities face strong 
restrictions.
Multivariate Regression Results
Table 1 shows the results of multivariate linear regressions using the country 
types, democracy, and political globalization as predictor variables. For the 
country types, we chose latecomer nations as the reference category, because 
they are theoretically predicted to be least likely to grant immigrants rights. 
Because with a sample size of 29 we have limited statistical power, we also 
report significance at the p < .10 level. Statistical significance and power issues 
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should anyway be relativized in the case at hand, because ours is not a random 
sample from the population of 200 or so independent states, but a sample 
weighted by the absolute and relative sizes of countries’ immigrant popula-
tions, which altogether includes 60% of the world immigrant population. We 
use classical instead of robust standard errors because Breusch–Pagan/Cook–
Weisberg post-estimation tests do not provide any evidence of heteroscedastic-
ity. Moreover, Wooldridge (2015) cautions against using robust standard errors 
with small sample sizes. He argues that “with small sample sizes, the robust t 
statistic can have distributions that are not very close to the t distribution, and 
that could throw off our inference” (Wooldridge, 2015, p. 275). Indeed, we find 
that in our case, robust standard errors tend to be lower than classical standard 
errors. Relying on the latter is therefore more conservative.
The results show that in line with Hypotheses 2 and 4, former colonial pow-
ers, settler countries, and democracies have granted immigrants more rights. 
The magnitudes of these differences are sizable: former colonial powers and 
settler countries score .31 and .35, respectively, higher than latecomer nations on 
the −1 to +1 index of all immigrant rights, which is more than a standard devia-
tion (.27), and almost one third of the variable’s empirical range (which runs 
from −.61 to +.47). Democracy also matters substantially: for every point on the 
Polity IV scale, immigrant rights increase by .04, implying that non-democra-
cies (Polity IV scores of 5 or lower) score at least .20 lower on immigrant rights 
than full democracies (Polity score +10). Indeed, as Figure 1 showed, all former 
colonial powers are situated in the individually inclusive top half of the figure, 
and the same is true for all settler countries, with the exception of non-demo-
cratic Singapore. All non-democratic countries are situated on the culturally 
Table 1. Multivariate Regression Results of ICRI Immigrant Rights on Historical 





Cultural and religious 
difference rights
Latecomer nation (reference category) — — —
Former colonial power .31 (.10)** .31 (.12)* .31 (.12)*
Other early nation-state −.00 (.10) −.04 (.12) .04 (.12)
Settler country .35 (.09)*** .33 (.12)** .37 (.11)**
Other former colony .20 (.13) −.02 (.16) .44 (.16)**
Democracy .04 (.01)** .03 (.01)* .04 (.01)**
Political globalization (divided by 10) .03 (.03) .05 (.03) .01 (.03)
N 29 29 29
Adjusted R2 .628 .591 .481
ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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monist side of the spectrum, and all but one of them—Venezuela—are among 
the less inclusive countries regarding individual equality rights.
The results, however, do not support Hypothesis 5, which states that supra-
national obligations and commitments have an independent impact on immi-
grant rights. Bi-variately political globalization is significantly positively 
correlated with immigrant rights (r = .44, p < .05), but once we take into 
account that democracies are more politically globalized (r = .49, p < .01), 
countries’ degree of political globalization does not seem to exert much of an 
independent influence. Even if, in view of the small sample size, we disregard 
the lack of statistical significance, the coefficients for political globalization 
have a modest magnitude. A one standard deviation increase by 23 points on 
the 0 to 100 political globalization scale is associated with an increase of only 
.07 for immigrant rights overall. For individual equality rights, the effect size 
is somewhat larger (+.11 for a one standard deviation increase of political 
globalization) and comes close to statistical significance at the p < .10 level. 
Results using the density of international NGO’s as an alternative indicator of 
political globalization provide even less support for Hypothesis 5. Using the 
number of human rights treaties signed reveals a marginally significant effect 
(B = .03, p = .082) on individual equality rights, which is, however, substan-
tially not very large: an increase of +.07 in individual equality rights for a one 
standard deviation increase of 2.6 ratified human rights treaties. All in all, 
these results confirm Joppke’s (2001) idea that nationally circumscribed 
norms of inclusion and equality, rather than supranational obligations and 
norms are decisive when it comes to providing immigrants access to rights.
In view of the strong emphasis in the literature on the contrast between 
supposedly “civic” nations where the territorial state predated the idea of 
nationhood and supposedly “ethnic” latecomer nations where the idea of the 
nation predated statehood, the most striking finding is that the difference 
between early and latecomer nations does not even come remotely close to 
being significant and even has the wrong sign for two of the three regres-
sions. Our results suggest that the contrast that Brubaker found between the 
degree to which France and Germany have historically granted immigrants 
access to equal rights may not have been so much due to their early and late 
statehood, respectively, but to the fact that France has, and Germany does not 
have a long and significant history of colonialism.
That colonialism has more to do with immigrant rights than has previously 
been acknowledged is also suggested by the fact that, once we control for 
democracy, non-settler former colonies turn out to be more likely to grant 
immigrants cultural rights. Here, however, we are skating on thin ice, because 
we only have three non-settler former colonies in our sample (South Africa, 
Ghana, and Kuwait).
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In the regressions of Table 1, we distinguished between early and latecomer 
nations in a dichotomous fashion (independent before or after 1850) and 
applied the distinction only to countries that were not former colonies or colo-
nizers. However, 1850 is admittedly somewhat arbitrary as a boundary, and the 
timing of independent nationhood may matter for former colonies and coloniz-
ers as well. In Table 2, we therefore reran the regressions using a continuous 
specification across all countries. We take the count of the years (in decades) 
since a country became independent or unified, going maximally back in time 
until 1648, the year of the Peace of Westphalia that is widely regarded as the 
starting point of the international order of sovereign nation-states. The results 
as shown in Table 2 are virtually identical to those in Table 1.11 No matter how 
we specify the timing of independent nationhood, it has no influence on the 
degree to which countries grant rights to immigrants. The decisive country 
characteristics remain being a former colonial power or a settler country and 
the degree of democracy. The only noteworthy difference between Tables 1 and 
2 is that in the regression of individual equality rights, political globalization 
becomes marginally significant.
Robustness Checks
Taking the regressions of Table 1 as our point of departure, we first investigate 
to what extent some of our country classification decisions affect the results. 
To begin with, we exclude Israel, our most difficult case to classify. There is 
Table 2. Multivariate Regression Results of ICRI Immigrant Rights on Historical 
and Institutional Predictors With Alternative Specification of the Timing of National 





Cultural and religious 
difference rights
Years since independence 
(divided by 10)
−.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Former colonial power .31 (.08)*** .35 (.10)** .28 (.10)*
Settler country .35 (.08)*** .33 (.11)** .35 (.10)**
Other former colony .20 (.12) −.04 (.16) .42 (.15)*
Democracy .04 (.01)** .03 (.01)* .04 (.01)**
Political globalization  
(divided by 10)
.03 (.03) .05 (.03)† .02 (.03)
N 29 29 29
Adjusted R2 .68 .597 .478
ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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no substantial difference in the results: All predictors that were significant 
remain so, and all that were insignificant remain so, too. Using the jackknife 
method, we generalize this approach to robustness by one after the other 
excluding one of the 29 cases from the analysis. The results are highly similar, 
with one exception: The coefficient for other former colonies in the all immi-
grant rights regression now becomes significant at the p < .05 level (B = .44, p 
= .024). We also ran models excluding two pairs of potentially problematic 
cases. As we argued above, our decision to classify Turkey and Austria as 
early nations may be contested. However, if we exclude these two countries, 
there is again hardly any change in the results. The only exception is that in the 
regression of individual equality rights, political globalization becomes mar-
ginally significant (B = .01, p = .09). Nothing substantial changes, either, when 
we alternatively exclude Denmark and Belgium. One could argue that 
Denmark should also have been classified as a colonial power (because it still 
had some sparsely populated overseas territories left after World War II), or 
alternatively that Belgium should not have been coded as a colonial power 
because its occupation of the Congo was relatively short compared with the 
long colonial histories of the other colonial powers (Janoski, 2010).
Next, we consider the possibility that the relationships we observe in Table 1 
could be spurious because we fail to control for potentially relevant economic 
and demographic variables. We consider the following variables and provide 
some intuitive arguments why they might be relevant for immigrant rights:
Per capita GDP at purchasing power parity. One could argue that rich countries 
can more easily afford to grant immigrants rights or that they depend more on 
immigrant labor for their economies and grant rights to be attractive for 
immigrants (IMF, 2015).
Gini Coefficient of income inequality. Countries with more equal income distri-
butions might also be more inclined to grant equal rights to immigrants (Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2015).
Economic globalization. Similar to the argument for rich countries, countries 
that are more strongly integrated into the world economy may depend more 
on immigrant labor and might therefore be more inclined to grant rights to be 
attractive for immigrants. (KOF Economic Globalization Index developed by 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology ETH in Zurich)12
Immigrant population fraction. Large immigrant populations could be per-
ceived as more threatening than small populations, resulting in fewer rights 
for immigrants where there are many of them. Conversely, large immigrant 
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populations may be more able to push for rights than small ones, resulting in 
the opposite pattern.13
Ethnic diversity. We use a combined scale of Alesina, Devleeschauwer, East-
erly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg’s (2003) and Fearon’s (2003) ethnic diversity scores. 
Cultural homogeneity might be associated with an ethnic conception of 
nationhood, whereas cultural heterogeneity might facilitate a civic idea of the 
nation that is more open to granting rights to immigrants.
We add these variables one at a time, because including all of them at once 
leads standard errors to explode because of the high number of predictor vari-
ables relative to the number of cases. The results of these additional analyses 
are clear-cut: None of the control variables comes even close to attaining statis-
tical significance. Moreover, their inclusion does not significantly affect the 
pattern of the findings. Including GDP, Gini Coefficient, or ethnic diversity 
does not lead to any substantial changes. Including the immigrant population 
fraction leaves the results for all rights and cultural difference rights unaffected, 
but in the individual equality rights regression, the coefficient of democracy 
drops just below the .10 significance level (B = .03, p = .11). Inclusion of eco-
nomic globalization leaves all significant coefficients unaffected, but other 
colonies become marginally significant in the all rights regression (B = .28, p = 
.07) and so does political globalization in the individual equality rights regres-
sion (B = .01, p = .08). These few changes are all marginal and produced by the 
inclusion of variables that themselves are statistically insignificant, and they 
therefore do not call any of our conclusions seriously into question.
A Replication With the MIPEX Immigrant Rights 
Data
We put the robustness of our findings to an even stronger test by using an 
alternative measure of the dependent variable. The MIPEX data discussed 
above provide such an alternative, at least for the individual equality dimen-
sion of immigrant rights. This, moreover, allows us to replicate our analysis 
on a different sample of countries. ICRI and MIPEX overlap for 20 countries, 
but MIPEX scores for 2010 are available for 19 additional countries. For 
three of these, Armenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, no data are available from 
the KOF political globalization index, and for Malta, there are no Polity IV 
data. This leaves us with 15 additional countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and South Korea. In terms of our classification 
of countries’ histories of nationhood and colonialism, we classify Greece as 
an early nation-state (independent since 1829), Cyprus as a former colony, 
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and the remaining 13 as latecomer nations. Even though MIPEX includes 
more countries than ICRI, it is less inclusive of the world’s immigrant popu-
lation because most of the additional countries in MIPEX have small immi-
grant populations: The 20 countries included in both data sets cover 49% of 
the world immigrant population, ICRI’s nine unique countries add 11%, 
whereas the 15 countries unique to MIPEX add only 3%.
For comparison, the first column of Table 3 replicates the regression of 
individual equality rights using the ICRI data from Table 1. The second col-
umn shows the results using MIPEX. Even though both the measure of immi-
grant rights and the sample of countries are different, the results are 
substantially identical: Former colonial powers, settler countries, and democ-
racies grant immigrants more rights, and there is no difference between early 
and latecomer nations, nor is there any significant effect of political global-
ization. Results using years since independence instead of the dichotomous 
distinction of late and early nation-states are similar, except that the coeffi-
cient for former colonizers becomes more highly significant at p < .05.
The MIPEX data in addition provide us with the possibility to zoom in on 
Europe. Theories of nationhood and immigrant citizenship rights have been 
developed with Europe as the frame of reference, and therefore, if there is any 
place where we should find evidence of a difference between early and late-
comer nations, it should be here. Moreover, Europe is at the forefront of 
political globalization, so again, this should be the best place to find evidence 
Table 3. Multivariate Regression Results of ICRI and MIPEX Individual Equality 
Rights on Historical and Institutional Predictors (B Coefficients and Standard Errors).
ICRI individual equality 






Former colonial power .31 (.12)* 11.39 (5.98)† 15.55 (5.40)**
Other early nation-state −.04 (.12) −5.13 (5.50) 0.30 (5.57)
Settler country .33 (.12)** 13.02 (7.34)† —
Other former colony −.02 (.16) −11.09 (12.62) −11.68 (12.60)
Democracy .03 (.01)* 5.34 (2.42)* 6.40 (2.76)*
Political globalization (/10) .05 (.03) 1.54 (1.25) —
EU member — — −0.23 (6.83)
Schengen member — — 6.17 (5.64)
n 29 35 30
Adjusted R2 .591 .347 .340
ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants; MIPEX = Migrant Integration Policy Index.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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of its effects. In the third column of Table 3, we exclude Japan, South Korea, 
the United States, Canada, and Australia from the analysis, and focus on the 
remaining 30 European countries. As relevant measures of political global-
ization in this context, we take EU membership (Switzerland, Norway, 
Croatia, and Turkey were not members as of 2008) and membership of the 
Schengen area of open borders and common visa policies (five EU members, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, are not 
Schengen members; two non-EU member states, Norway and Switzerland, 
are part of Schengen).
The results show that neither EU nor Schengen membership has a signifi-
cant impact on the granting of rights to immigrants. We again find that former 
colonial powers and democratic countries grant immigrants more rights, but 
that there is no significant difference between early nation-states and late-
comer nations.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we have presented the results of the geographically broadest 
study of immigrant rights undertaken so far. It uses two different cross-
national data sets on immigrant rights (ICRI and MIPEX) and covers alto-
gether 44 countries across all continents that are home to almost two thirds of 
the world’s immigrant population. Besides the rich, Western democracies on 
which most previous work has been based, we include several non-demo-
cratic, non-OECD, and non-Western countries. This puts us in a position to 
test existing theories on immigrant rights in a wider sample that exhibits 
greater variation on crucial theoretical variables such as the degree of democ-
racy and political globalization, as well as on potentially confounding vari-
ables such as GDP and autochthonous ethnic diversity.
In view of the importance that has been attached in the literature on immi-
grant rights to the timing of nationhood and associated types of nationalism, 
our most striking finding is perhaps that there is no significant difference 
between early, supposedly “civic” nations, and late, supposedly “ethnic” 
ones. Early nations such as Denmark and Switzerland can be as restrictive in 
granting immigrant rights as, or even more restrictive than latecomer nations 
such as Norway and Germany.
The only early nation-states that clearly stand out with more inclusive 
immigrant rights are those that were major colonizing powers: the United 
Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium. This find-
ing is in line with previous studies (Howard, 2009; Janoski, 2010) but con-
firms the relevance of colonialism as a facilitator of immigrant rights within 
a wider sample of countries. Our results suggest that the much-debated 
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difference between the ways in which France and Germany have historically 
dealt with immigrant rights has more to do with the fact that the former was 
a major colonial power and the latter not, rather than with their different tra-
jectories and timing of nationhood.
Another aspect of colonialism also turned out to be important: Former 
colonies where the native population density was small and that developed 
through mass immigration of settlers tend to have significantly more inclu-
sive immigrant rights policies. This result, too, confirms previous findings 
(Janoski, 2010), but extends the range of observations beyond the Anglo-
Saxon settler states to include Argentina, Venezuela, and Singapore.
The fact that both former colonial powers and settler countries are more 
likely to extend rights to immigrants indicates that historical experiences 
with immigration and cultural difference matter. Former colonial powers 
have a heritage of centuries of interaction with races, cultures, and religions 
in other parts of the world, which European countries that were not or only 
marginally involved in colonialism lack. Settler countries have developed as 
nations of immigrants, and the immigration experience is part of their national 
identities. Interestingly, in both cases, these experiences have positive impacts 
on immigrant rights even though colonialism and settlement occurred under 
conditions of sharp inequality and conflict between colonizers and colonized 
and between settlers and natives. One could easily have imagined the rela-
tionship with immigrant rights to have been the other way around, in the 
sense that the racism, exploitation, and extermination that accompanied colo-
nialism and settlement would have made colonial powers and settler coun-
tries more, rather than less restrictive in granting rights to immigrants, or at 
least to those that are racially and culturally different. Historically, former 
colonizers and settler countries have certainly had racist immigration policies 
(see FitzGerald & Cook-Martín, 2014). But still, at least in the long run, their 
accumulated experience with cultural difference and immigration has made 
them more open toward immigrants and their cultural difference than coun-
tries without a colonial experience.
A likely mechanism behind the inclusive approaches of former colonial 
powers and settler countries to immigrant rights is electoral politics, the same 
factor that we identified in our earlier study of changes in immigrant rights in 
Europe over the period 1980-2008 (Koopmans et al., 2012) as the major 
driver of temporal change. In settler democracies, this is most obvious. For 
example, according to the 2011 census, 28% of Australians were foreign-
born, and 46% had at least one foreign-born parent. Combined with easy 
access to naturalization and jus soli acquisition of the nationality for 
Australian-born children of immigrants, this implies a huge electorate for 
whom immigrant rights are about themselves, their children, and their 
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parents. Democracy is, of course, a precondition for immigrants to have any 
electoral influence, and it is therefore no coincidence that Singapore, the only 
non-democratic settler country in our sample, deviates from the other settler 
countries.
On a smaller scale, similar electoral processes occur in democracies that 
used to be colonial powers. Many colonial immigrants came to these coun-
tries with full citizenship rights (e.g., French Algerians or Dutch Indonesians) 
with voting rights for nationals of former colonies (e.g., citizens of British 
Commonwealth countries in the United Kingdom), or they can profit from 
bilateral agreements with former colonies that grant easier and faster natural-
ization (e.g., citizens of many Latin American countries in Spain). Some for-
mer colonial powers still retain overseas possessions, the inhabitants of 
which are full citizens who can either directly vote for the national parliament 
(e.g., inhabitants of the French overseas departments) or have unrestricted 
immigration rights and full voting rights on arrival (e.g., Dutch Antilleans). 
Thus, postcolonial immigrants and their children contribute to the growth of 
an electorate that is rooted in the immigration experience and that will be 
more sympathetic to inclusive immigrant rights than the electorates of coun-
tries where very few voters have an immigrant background.
While in earlier studies of immigrant rights democracy was a virtual con-
stant, our wider sample of countries allowed us to show that democracy is an 
important condition for granting citizenship rights to immigrants. Partly, this 
effect of democracy is, in line with Joppke’s (2001) arguments, one of norma-
tive spillover: Countries that do not grant their own citizens many rights are 
not likely to be open to immigrants, either, and vice versa. However, the 
electoral mechanisms just described will also play a role, even—on a smaller 
scale and at a slower pace—in countries without any history of colonialism 
or settlement. Even in these countries, immigration inevitably trickles down 
into the electorate. As we showed earlier (Koopmans et al., 2012), across 
Western Europe, the immigrant electorate has expanded over the period 
1980-2008. Even in countries with restrictive naturalization regimes, some 
immigrants will naturalize, children will be born to mixed marriages of 
nationals and non-nationals, and thus slowly the immigrant electorate 
expands. If the immigrant population is large enough, even very low natural-
ization rates can lead to rapid growth of the immigrant electorate: Between 
1980 and 2008, immigrant voters (defined as those who are either themselves 
born abroad or have at least one foreign-born parent) expanded from 3% to 
12% of the Swiss electorate (Koopmans et al., 2012).
In line with previous studies, but based on a much stronger evidential 
basis, we further show that beyond the self-commitment of democratic coun-
tries to minimum standards of inclusiveness and equality, countries’ 
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integration into, and commitment to supranational norms, conventions, and 
institutions do not have much of an additional effect. We only found some 
substantively modest and statistically marginally significant effects in this 
direction in some of the regression specifications for the individual equality 
dimension of immigrant rights. In Europe, the most politically globalized 
continent, we find no evidence at all of an impact on immigrant rights of 
commitments to supranational obligations generally or specifically of mem-
bership in the EU or in the Schengen area of open borders and common visa 
policies.
Overall, the predictive power of our models using the ICRI data as the 
dependent variable is very good, ranging from 63% explained variance across 
all rights to 60% for individual equality rights and 48% for cultural difference 
rights. The analyses using the MIPEX data have lower explained variances, 
around 35%. This may either be a result of the MIPEX data containing more 
noise or of the lower range of variation in the MIPEX data because they are 
largely made up of European countries, and have only limited variation on 
the democracy variable. Our models using the ICRI data also predict the 
scores of individual countries quite accurately. Inspection of the standardized 
residuals from the regressions of Table 1 reveals two noteworthy exceptions. 
The score of France is significantly lower than the model for cultural differ-
ence rights predicts. This is most likely due to France’s strong commitment 
to a militant form of secularism known as laïcité, which has made the country 
more restrictive in granting religious rights than could be expected on the 
basis of it being a democracy and a former colonial power. For future analy-
ses, it would be worthwhile to look more closely at the role of church–state 
relationships for immigrant rights on the cultural difference dimension. 
Unfortunately, we found currently available comparative measures not to be 
useful for our analyses.14 Sweden is the other exception; it scores signifi-
cantly higher on both the individual equality and cultural difference rights 
dimensions than its status as a non-colonizer would lead us to expect. For this 
outlier, we do not have an explanation on offer, especially not because its two 
Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark, differ considerably from 
Sweden.
Although our study has begun to extend the focus beyond the “usual sus-
pects” from Europe and the Anglo-Saxon immigration countries, even our 
sample still includes only a limited number of non-democracies and non-
OECD countries. The selection of additional country-cases should be guided 
by theoretical considerations (e.g., Bjerre, Helbling, Römer, & Zobel, 2015; 
Goodman, 2015). In view of the variables that our analysis has shown to be 
relevant, it would be particularly valuable to extend the range of observations 
to include additional Latin American settler countries (e.g., Uruguay, Chile, 
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Brazil), as well as other former colonies, both democratic and non-demo-
cratic ones. Our results suggested that not only settler countries but also for-
mer colonies more generally might be more accommodating where cultural 
rights for immigrants are concerned, but because our sample only included 
three former colonies that are not settler countries (Ghana, South Africa, and 
Kuwait), this observation as yet rests on a too narrow basis.
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Argentina .17 .38 .07 —
Australia .36 .28 .34 48
Austria −.16 −.24 −.08 62
Belgium .39 .56 .22 67
Bulgaria — — — 41
Canada .40 .44 .36 72
Croatia — — — 42
Cyprus — — — 35
Czech Republic −.19 .06 −.50 46
Denmark −.10 .00 −.20 53
Estonia — — — 46
Finland — — — 69
France .00 .18 −.19 51
Germany −.01 .08 −.10 57
Greece — — — 49
Ghana .13 −.14 .40 —
Hungary — — — 45
Ireland — — — 49
Israel −.30 −.38 −.24 —
Italy .05 .10 .00 60
Japan −.06 −.02 −.10 38
Kuwait −.62 −.69 −.53 —
Latvia — — — 31
Lithuania — — — 40
Luxemburg — — — 59
Netherlands .43 .42 .44 68
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New Zealand .32 .52 .12 —
Norway .18 .36 .00 66
Poland .08 .08 .09 42
Portugal .28 .44 .06 79
Romania — — — 45
Russia −.10 .00 −.20 —
Singapore −.31 −.40 −.24 —
Slovakia — — — 36
Slovenia — — — 49
South Africa .12 .07 .18 —
South Korea — — — 60
Spain .31 .28 .33 63
Sweden .47 .58 .36 83
Switzerland −.18 −.02 −.36 43
Turkey −.14 −.09 −.19 24
United Kingdom .45 .58 .32 57
United States .21 .20 .23 62
Venezuela .17 .31 .00 —
M .08 .14 .02 52
ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants; MIPEX = Migrant Integration Policy Index.
Table A2. Mean Values of Independent Variables Used in the Main ICRI Analyses 























Argentina 3 8 87.42 0 0 192 18.0 0.85
Australia 3 10 84.82 0 0 77 13.5 0.93
Austria 2 10 93.86 1 1 360 15.5 0.90
Belgium 1 8 94.22 1 1 169 16.5 0.94
Bulgaria 0 9 70.89 1 0 100 14.0 0.66
Canada 3 10 73.21 0 0 77 13.0 0.96
Croatia 0 9 69.92 0 0 17 15.0 0.63
Cyprus 4 10 31.38 1 0 48 15.0 —
Czech Republic 0 8 83.27 1 1 15 14.5 0.81
Table A1. (continued)
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Denmark 2 10 88.72 1 1 360 15.5 0.89
Estonia 0 9 42.14 1 1 17 13.0 0.51
Finland 0 10 80.13 1 1 91 15.5 0.89
France 1 9 98.64 1 1 360 17.0 0.99
Germany 0 10 95.17 1 1 138 16.0 1.00
Greece 0 10 83.85 1 1 179 15.0 0.83
Ghana 4 8 68.87 0 0 51 14.5 0.42
Hungary 0 10 81.89 1 1 88 14.0 0.85
Ireland 0 10 74.91 1 0 71 13.5 0.78
Israel 0 10 43.05 0 0 60 9.0 0.83
Italy 0 10 95.62 1 1 137 17.0 0.97
Japan 2 10 83.59 0 0 360 10.0 0.93
Kuwait 4 −7 45.07 0 0 47 9.0 0.35
Latvia 0 8 27.12 1 1 17 12.0 0.49
Lithuania 0 10 46.13 1 1 18 15.5 0.52
Luxemburg 0 10 33.00 1 1 118 16.5 —
Netherlands 1 10 87.38 1 1 360 15.0 0.96
New Zealand 3 10 65.94 0 0 77 13.0 0.78
Norway 0 10 78.18 0 1 103 14.5 0.86
Poland 0 10 91.12 1 1 90 14.0 0.87
Portugal 1 10 86.45 1 1 360 17.0 0.85
Romania 0 9 84.82 1 0 130 14.5 0.71
Russia 2 4 96.04 0 0 360 11.0 0.81
Singapore 3 −2 32.12 0 0 43 4.5 0.59
Slovakia 0 10 65.07 1 1 15 16.0 0.62
Slovenia 0 10 54.49 1 1 17 15.5 0.63
South Africa 4 9 82.80 0 0 77 13.5 0.83
South Korea 2 8 86.28 0 0 63 11.0 0.76
Spain 1 10 91.49 1 1 360 17.0 0.96
Sweden 2 10 94.69 1 1 360 14.5 0.92
Switzerland 2 10 86.15 0 1 360 12.5 0.94
Turkey 2 7 87.88 0 0 360 15.5 0.73
United Kingdom 1 10 95.52 1 0 360 13.0 0.94
United States 3 10 96.67 0 0 232 7.0 0.97
Venezuela 3 5 51.85 0 0 189 15.0 0.62
M — 8.6 74.81 0.59 0.52 161 13.9 0.79
Country type 0 = latecomer nation; 1 = former colonizer; 2 = other early nation; 3 = settler country; 4 = other former 
colony. ICRI = Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants; KOF = Konjunkturforschungsstelle; MIPEX = 
Migrant Integration Policy Index.
Table A2. (continued)
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Notes
 1. A number of recent research projects have begun collecting data on immigra-
tion rights and policies, including Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) 
(Bjerre, Helbling, Römer, & Zobel, 2015; Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 
2016) and International Migration Policy And Law Analysis (IMPALA) (Beine 
et al., 2015). So far, only preliminary results from these projects have been pub-
lished, and their data are not yet publicly available. The question of the rela-
tionship between immigrant and immigration rights is intriguing and can, in the 
near future, be addressed by linking these new immigration policy data sets to 
immigrant rights data such as ours.
 2. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_immigrant_population
 3. See www.wzb.eu/en/research/migration-and-diversity/migration-integration- 
transnationalization/projects/indicators-of-citizenship
 4. For a full list of the ICRI indicators used in this project, see www.wzb.eu/en/
research/migration-and-diversity/migration-integration-transnationalization/
projects/indicators-of-citizenship
 5. See https://www.wzb.eu/en/research/migration-and-diversity/migration-integration- 
transnationalization/projects/indicators-of-citizenship
 6. Since then, two additional comparative data sources on immigrant rights have 
become available, which both refer to the individual equality dimension of 
immigrant rights. The European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship 
(EUDO) has compiled CITLAW Citizenship Law Indicators (see Vink & 
Bauböck, 2013) on loss and acquisition of nationality across European coun-
tries, of immigrants, natives, as well as emigrants. For the 18 countries that are 
included in both CITLAW and ICRI, the CITLAW sub-indicator on general ordi-
nary naturalization (ANATORD) correlates .84 (p < .001) with ICRI’s individual 
equality dimension. The immigrant inclusion index (IMIX; see Blatter et al., 
2015) codes electoral rights of immigrants, combining indicators on nationality 
acquisition and voting rights. For the 15 overlapping countries, the correlation 
between IMIX and ICRI’s individual equality dimension is .79 (p < .001).
 7. Notably, although our individual equality dimension correlates very highly with 
alternative indices (.82 with Migrant Integration Policy Index [MIPEX]; .84 with 
CITLAW/ANATORD, and .79 with IMIX), mutual correlations among the other 
indices are much weaker (MIPEX-CITLAW/ANATORD = .48; MIPEX-IMIX = 
.48; IMIX-CITLAW/ANATORD = .58), suggesting that our index best captures 
the common underlying construct of immigrant rights.
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 8. By classifying them in the group of settler states and not among the former colo-
nial powers, we disregard the fact that Australia and New Zealand briefly ruled 
former German colonies (Papua New Guinea and Samoa, respectively) and that 
the United States even today exerts sovereignty over a few former Spanish and 
German possessions (Puerto Rico and several Pacific islands). Although the 
limited immigration flows from these possessions may have resulted in some 
dynamics comparable with those in the European colonizing countries, we con-
sider the experience of massive settler immigration to be much more consequen-
tial and typifying for Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
 9. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
10. See http://indicators.ohchr.org/. The index score considers altogether 18 human 
rights treaties and protocols. A full point was assigned for ratification; half a 
point was assigned when a country has signed but not (yet) ratified.
11. We alternatively considered a logistic or quadratic specification of years since 
independence, but results remained substantially unaltered.
12. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
13. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_immigrant_popula-
tion. We used the figures from the 2013 United Nations (UN) report.
14. We experimented with such measures, but in the end decided against using them, 
for two reasons. First, the available data sources, Fox (2008, and Religion and 
State Project Round 2) and Grim and Finke (2006), hardly correlate with one 
another, raising doubts about the validity of either source. Moreover, in both 
cases, the way in which countries deal with immigrant minority religions is part 
of the information that flows into the coding, thus creating for us a problem of 
conflation of independent and dependent variables.
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